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翻译福山关于历史的终结论的回顾

翻译了福山的三篇播客的内容,是关于历史终结论的论述,这是完整的中英文翻译版本。很多人认为福山对未来的预测错的离谱,但是在听过福山的观点之后会发现他并不是这样看待的。在不到一个月之前,福山又做客Ezra Klein Show, 谈了他的新书,对很多东西的看法还是很具有启发性的。而下文中的播客内容,串联了福山至少五本书的内容,分别是母本《历史的终结及最后之人》,关于科技对历史终结影响的著作《我们的后人类未来:生物科技革命的后果》,关于人类历史的演进对历史终结影响的著作《政治秩序的起源:从前人类时代到法国大革命》《政治秩序与政治衰败·从工业革命到民主全球化》,关于身份政治对历史终结影响的著作《Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment》,在谈到自己的结论时,还提到了亨廷顿的理论对历史终结论的影响,涉及到的三本著作是《变化社会中的政治秩序》《第三波:20世纪后期的民主化浪潮》《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》。一起来听一听福山对自己观点的阐释吧。

翻译并非逐句按照字面意思翻译,存在不通顺和理解错误之处还请指出。翻译以及分享已获得教授许可。

1. End of History Revisited Part 1

2. End of History Revisited Part 2

3. Identity and the End of History

一 End of History Revisited Part 1

This is Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law podcast. We are studying why governments fail. We are going to talk about economic and political development at home and around the world.

Today we are listening to Francis Fukuyama, the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli institute of Stanford University. Welcome to the CDDRL democracy world.

This is a podcast on the End Of History in retrospect. The single question I’ve been asked most incessantly since 1989 is, “Well, what about the end of history? Doesn’t X invalidate the thesis that you articulated back then?” where X is something that has happened in the newspapers and on television, some big events in international politics. This question is usually asked by somebody that did not understand the original concept of the end of history, and who has not read my book The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1992. So the purpose of this podcast is simply to go over that hypothesis and to explain what I meant by it, and to explain the ways which my thinking since then have actually changed. It would actually be strange if the passage of almost thirty years time did not lead to a certain evolution in the way that I thought about the world. But nonetheless it is important to distinguish between reasonable critiques and ones that are silly or based on simple misunderstandings.

这是回顾“历史的终结”理论的一期播客。自1989年以来我一直被问到的一个问题是,“X事件的发生不正好意味着你当时提出的那个理论是无效的吗“这里的X指的是报纸和电视上所报道的一些国际政治中的重大事件。这个问题通常是由那些不理解“历史的终结”理论的人提出的,而且他们也没有读过我在1992年出版的《历史的终结及最后的人》这本书。所以这个播客的目的只是去回顾这个理论并且去解释我通过这个理论所要传达的意思,以及解释从那之后我的思想发生的改变:因为这篇文章已经发表快要三十年了,如果这三十年来我的思考方式没有发生什么进步和迭代反而是奇怪的。而对于评论来说,区分哪些是有理有据的,哪些是浅薄的甚至是基于对我理论的误解的也是很重要的。

Let’s begin with the discussion of the title of my original article “The End Of History? “ that appeared in the journal The National Interest in the summer of 1989. “History” as I was using it was the history with a capital “H”. There are other words that people use to describe the same phenomenon today as more likely to be spoken of as development or perhaps modernization. The End of History was meant more as the goal rather than simply a termination so that the End of History was raising the question: what is the terminal point or what is the goal of the development process or the modernization process.

让我们从讨论最初于1989年夏天发表在《国家利益》期刊上的那篇论文“历史终结了吗?”开始吧。在这里,我把英文History的首字母大写了,所以这里的这个History, 用今天的时髦的词汇表达出来就是“发展”或者“现代化”的意思。所以The End of History这个理论所要探索的是一种目标,而不仅仅是一个终点,也就是说The End of History是提出了这样的一个问题:人类发展或者现代化的目标是什么;哪些现象的出现会证明现代化的终点达到了?

The phase the End of History was not the one originated to me. It was used first by the great German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel was the first historicism philosopher meaning that you could not interpret thought or human institutions without understanding their historical evolution. His mode of thinking was taken over by Karl Marx who in a certain sense had the most famous version of the end of history. Marx argued that human societies evolved. They modernize from primitive feudal ones up through bourgeois societies. And the end of history for Marx was a communist utopia. This was his prediction and his hope. The simple argument I made was that in 1989 it didn’t look like Marx’s version of the end of history was going to work out. We were never going to get that communist utopia. Mikhail Gorbachev was putting Soviet Union through [perestroika and glasnost] accepting the basic principles of modern liberal democracy and therefore if there was to be an end of history, it wasn’t going to be communism. It was going to be some form of liberal democracy connected to market economy.

The End of History这个概念并不是我的原创,它最先是被伟大的德国哲学家黑格尔所使用的。黑格尔是第一位历史主义哲学家,这个学派所倡导的是必须研究与解释人类历史发展,基于这些解释才能认真了解社会与政治。之后,卡尔马克思很好的继承了这一学派思想的衣钵,而马克思在某种意义上,提出了我们所知道的最有名的历史终结理论。马克思认为人类社会是不断发展的,它们现代化的路径是从原始的封建社会一路发展到资本主义社会,最终马克思认为人类的历史将会终结于共产主义:这是马克思所预言并且寄予希望的。但是在1989年,我提出的论点是马克思的历史的终结的理论不太可能行得通,人类社会的发展永远都到不了共产主义:当时的现实是,戈尔巴乔夫正在苏联进行改革开放,并且接受了现代自由民主思想的一些基本原则。所以说如果历史的发展有一个最终目标的话,从那个时候来看,它不会是共产主义,它应该是自由民主和市场经济相结合的一种模式。

The idea of the end of history was taken up again in the 1930s and 1940s by Alexandre Kojève. Kojève was a Russian French philosopher who led perhaps one of the most influential seminars in the mid-twentieth century, a seminar in Paris that included many of the great intellectual lights of the post-war period: Raymond Queneau, Georges Bataille, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Lacan, Raymond Aron and Éric Weil. Kojève argued that Hegel was fundamentally right that history had ended. He asserted moreover that history ended in the year 1806 at the time of the Battle of Jena when the Prussian monarchy was defeated by Napoleon.

黑格尔和马克思之后,The End of History的观念在1930和40年代的时候又被人们重新拿出来讨论,引导这场讨论的就是俄裔法国哲学家亚历山大·科耶夫。当时科耶夫在巴黎组织了一系列围绕黑格尔的研讨会,常来听讲的都是当时法国最重要的知识分子,包括雷蒙·格诺,乔治·巴代伊,莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂,雅各·拉冈,雷蒙·阿隆等人。科耶夫提出的观点认为黑格尔的思路大体上是正确的,并且科耶夫认为历史已经发展到终点了,我们现在所处的就是后历史时代。他更进一步的认为历史的终结发生在1806年耶拿战争之后,当时拿破仑率领的军队打败了普鲁士的君主制。

Now note, this was an assertion that was made right on the eve of the Second World War, in a tumultuous early 20th century that had seen the First World War: the killing of millions of people, the Bolshevik Revolution and was shortly to see the Chinese Revolution and the liberation of much of the what came to be known as the Third World from the colonial domination.

但是注意啦,这个断言所提出的时代,恰恰是第二次世界大战的前夜,在此之前,伏尸百万的第一次世界大战刚刚结束,布尔什维克在俄国取得了革命的胜利,一种新的意识形态出现了,而不久之后,人类又将目睹发生在中国的红色革命以及第三世界国家摆脱殖民统治的独立浪潮。

On the surface this is an absurd statement. But when a brilliant thinker like Alexandre Kojève makes something that sounds like an absurd statement, you need to think a little bit below the surface as to what he really meant. He was being ironic but in a certain sense he was pointing to an important truth, namely that the world had not progressed substantially beyond the principles of the French Revolution, that is to say beyond a political system based on the twin principles of liberty and equality, the principles of modern politics. And for all the storm that occurred in the 20th century or in the years since 1806, fundamentally what we were seeing was simply the spread of these principles from the metropolitan area to the provinces of the world.

从表面上看,这个观点是站不住脚的。但是如果这个连你都觉得可笑的观点被一位公认很有影响的思想家提出来的时候,你就要想一想是不是你的想法才是可笑的了。科耶夫的观点是有点搞,但是他也指出来了一个事实,就是世界发展的大潮流,并没有超出法国大革命所提出来的自由和平等这两个原则。也就是说1806年以后我们所看到的只不过是旧理念的传播,并没有新理念的产生。

What I was arguing in my 1989 article was not all that original. Maybe Kojève and behind him the Hegel were actually right. Maybe the fundamental principles of a modern society had been established 200 years ago and what we were witnessing was simply the implementation of them in different countries around the world. Maybe with reforms going on in the former Soviet Union and at that time in China as well, we would never arrived at socialism, we would never get to that higher stage of human society and that what we saw imperfect as it was was all we were going to get. That was the basic idea.

而我在1989年的论文中提出来的观点也并不全是原创的:也许科耶夫和黑格尔的理论是对的:人类社会发展的基本原则早在200多年前就已经确立了,我们所目睹的仅仅是它们的传播;或者也有可能如果随着前苏联以及那个年代中国改革的进行,人类社会永远都不会进入更高阶的社会主义,而我们所看到的不完美就是我们所能获得的一切。这是基本的观点。(没看懂这里说了个什么)

So one group of the critics would never fundamentally misunderstood my argument were actually the Marxism. There were meetings in Cuba, in the Soviet Union and other communist countries where people understood my argument about the end of history and they understood that it was a fundamental challenge to their own beliefs about the directionality of history.

所以从这一点上来说,马克思主义学者是永远不会从根本上误解我的论点的。这些学者在共产主义国家举行会议,他们不仅明白我关于历史终结的理论阐释了什么,并且他们将此看成是对他们的根本信念的挑战。

At the time that I wrote the article in the winter of 1988 and 1989, I was working as a policy analyst at the think tank the Rand Corporation, studying Soviet domestic politics. Mikhail Gorbachev recently had given a speech which he said, “the essence of socialism was competition.” When I heard this, I called up one of my friends who understood Hegel and said, “If Gorbachev is saying this then we must be at the end of History.”

我在1988年和1989年之间写作这篇文章之时,还是兰德公司专攻苏联内政的一位政策分析师。戈尔巴乔夫最近做了一次演讲,其中他说到社会主义的本质是竞争。我听到这句话之后一惊,马上就给我一个研究黑格尔的朋友打电话,他的反应是,如果戈尔巴乔夫真的这样说了,那么我们就已经到达历史的终点了。

The actual provenance of the article was a lecture series that was organized by Allan Bloom, my former teacher at the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago that winter. The overall rubric of the lecture series was the decline of the West. I was asked to give a lecture in it and I said, “Well, I had a lecture that would fit except the theme would not be the decline of the West but rather the triumph of the West.” I gave the lecture and then a couple months later was visited by Owen Harries who was the editor of a new magazine: The National Interest. He was soliciting ideas for articles and I told him about this lecture and he agreed to publish it and the rest so to speak is history.

这篇文章的实际出处是由Allan Bloom所组织的系列讲座,Allan Bloom是我的老师,当年他是芝大社会思想委员会的一名老师。这个系列讲座的主题是西方的衰落,我也被邀请做一次讲座。我当时就说了,讲座没问题,但是主题是关于西方的胜利。我给出了这次讲座,然后又过了几个月,Owen Harries正给新成立的国家利益期刊寻找文章,我就把这个系列讲座推荐给了他,他也同意发表我的文章。

The argument that I made in that 1989 article was not that democracy had suddenly come to characterize the whole world or that it would necessarily spread everywhere, much less that events somehow would stop occurring. The argument was rather that there did not seem to be superior alternatives port which the world appeared to be evolving.

我在1989年的文章中提出的论点并不是说民主突然就成为了全世界的标配了,或者它一定会在全世界范围内传播。何况这种传播将会停止。我在文中提出的观点是,按照当时的世界发展趋势来看,似乎并没有比自由民主和市场经济结合更高级的替代的形式出现。

The theory of History that I put forward in my book The End of History and the Last Man is what I back then describe as a weak version of modernization theory. A strong version of this theory was the dominant paradigm in American Social Science back in the 1950s and 60s. This strong version held that economic, social, political and cultural aspects of modernization were part of a single evolutionary process and they are that they were all mutually supportive as societies became richer, became more open, they became more democratic, this view became untenable in no small measure because of a critique made by Samuel Huntington in his book Political Order in Changing Societies that appeared in 1967. Huntington said that the political and economic dimensions of modernization often acted at cross purposes from one another. If there was too rapid social mobilization that outstrip the rate of political development, the result was not a happy democratic society but rather instability. In later years, Huntington would focus on another issue, culture. And the argument is societies would not converge over time but would remain trapped within preexisting cultural horizons.

而我在1992年的书里的观点可以说是一种弱化了的现代化理论。而强化版的理论是20世界50,60年代美国社会科学界所提出的主导范式理论。这一理论认为现代化的四个方面:经济,社会,政治和文化的现代化是一个单一进程的一部分,随着社会变得越来越富有,开放和民主,它们是会相互促进和支持的。但是根据亨廷顿在其1967年的书中所提出的观点,这种模式发展下去是会变得难以为继的。亨廷顿认为政治的现代化和经济的现代化是会彼此之间存在冲突的:如果社会流动的速度超过了政治发展的速度,结果就不是一个幸福民主的社会。之后亨廷顿又将他的研究转向了文化这个角度,提出的观点是社会并不会随着时间的推移出现趋同化,而是会被困在之前的文化背景中。

The driver of modernization described in my 1992 book was the weak version of this theory, it was weak because it allowed for contingency and human agency. Nothing was inevitable or pre-determined. Nonetheless I argued that modernization was a coherent process that did not look terribly different cross different human cultures. The reason for this was the nature of technology or what I call the “mechanism”. At any given stage of human history, the prevailing forms of technology determined a frontier of production possibilities. The prevailing form of economic organization then had critical effects on social organization and ultimately shaped the nature of politics as well. Thus, for example, the technologies of cold steel in large-scale manufacturing abandon the prior agrarian order and require both urbanization and higher levels of education. By contrast, the early phases of information revolution ended the monopoly on information of various hierarchies like the state and made horizontal mobilization more available, in other words it was more suitable to democratization. Higher levels of income would then produce a middle class that among all things being equal would have preferences for greater participation in political affairs. This explained the relatively strong correlation between countries that were wealthy and countries were democratic around the world.

而我书里面描述的现代化的驱动力就是这个理论的弱化的版本。之所以说是弱化的版本是因为其中加入了一些无可避免的偶然因素。尽管如此,我当时还是认为现代化是一个一以贯之的过程:在人类的不同文化之间并没有什么不同。我保持这样的观点,是因为在我看来,在人类社会的任何阶段,技术的形式决定了生产方式,在此基础上的经济组织方式又对社会组织以及政治产生影响。

举一个例子,钢铁大规模生产中的冷轧技术使得人类摆脱了先前的农业秩序,促进了城市化和高等教育的发展。相比之下,信息革命的早期阶段就结束了之前各个层面对信息的垄断,这就使得社会的横向流动更顺畅了。换句话说,信息的开放使得民主化的条件成熟了。更高的收入水平催生了中产阶级,而这个阶级对于政治参与的热情明显提高,这也解释了国家的富裕程度和民主化之间为什么有很强的关联性。

The clearest example of economic development leading to social convergence has been arisen in east Asian. Industrialization has taken root across the region from Japan to Korean to Taiwan to China. In each case, the social transformations brought about by this process have led to a convergence with western countries that went through it in earlier generations. There has been a massive shift of populations from the countryside to cities, greater investment in education and skills, development of urban middle class and a more complex and interdependent division of labor.

经济发展促进社会趋同的最典型的例子发生在东亚。工业化已经在日本,韩国,台湾,大陆等地区扎根。在这些例子当中,社会转型又导致了与西方国家的趋同,而西方国家在早前也经历了类似的过程。而这中间,又发生了人口的大规模迁移,对教育和技术的投资增加,城市中产阶级的发展,更复杂和相互依存的劳动分工的出现等一系列的现象。

In the cases of Japan, South Korean and Taiwan, there is also a political convergence. Each of these countries became liberal democracies over time, the latter two making the transition during the 1980s, right at the point when they shifted from being predominantly agrarian to predominantly urban industrial societies.

而在前三个地区,还发生了政治上同西方国家的趋同,随着时间的推移,它们都转变为自由民主的政体。而韩国和台湾地区在1980年代的转型恰好处在它们的经济模式从农业转向城镇化和工业化的时候。

This has not been a universal pattern, however. Singapore has a higher per capita income than the United States and yet remains a liberal electoral authoritarian regime. China has now reached a level of income comparable to that of South Korean and Taiwan in the 1980s and under Xi Jinping has moved in the opposite direction to a more repressive form of dictatorship.

但是注意了,上面提到的这个例子并不是普适的,比如新加坡就是一个特例。新加坡的人均GDP高于美国,但是政治上仍然是一个自由选举的专制政权。而中国大陆现在的收入水平已经达到了韩国和台湾1980年代的水平了,但是在习近平的领导之下,政治的发展方向却朝着独裁的方向去了。

There were number of qualifications to this picture that I painted back in 1992. Apart from the Chinese exception to which I will return shortly, there are several missing pieces to this picture that I understand much better now than I did in the early 1990s.

这就引起了我的反思。如果把我1992年所勾勒的人类社会发展的蓝图比喻成一幅画的话,很明显这幅画作还没有完成,还有缺失的部分,而我现在对于这些缺失部分的了解要比我在1990年代的理解深入的多。不过对于这些缺失,中国的因素我将单独分析。

The first was the question of how economic growth starts in the first place. Once you get on the up escalator, there are predictable social and political consequences. But many parts of the world seem mired in poverty with no realistic hopes of replicating the growth path charted by Japan, Korean and China. The reasons why such growth has not become more universal has to do with the lack of institutions and particularly a lack of a modern state. My earlier theory had focused on democracy and did not pay enough attention to the prerequisite of a relatively impersonal state that would maintain social order and provide basic public goods. Getting to such a modern state, what I subsequently labeled as “getting to Denmark” is actually a significantly more difficult task of political construction than is getting to some form of electoral democracy. Today there are well over 100 countries that would qualify as the latter: that is the electoral democracies including places like Iraq and Afghanistan. But there are only perhaps a couple dozen countries can boast of having a truly modern state. The reason that countries in East Asia have developed economically so successfully in the past two generations lie in the fact that they have developed the modern states prior to their confrontation with the West. They did not have to create such institutions as part of their modernization projects. But for other parts of the world, like sub-Saharan Africa where modern states often did not exist prior to colonization, the path to economic growth has been far more difficult, because they didn’t have the institutional frameworks for growth to occur. This then raised a question that I completely ignored in the 1992 book, which is the origins of the modern state itself. I have tried to correct this in my two-volume Political Order series which traces the rise, first, of states out of tribal societies and then the transition from patrimonial to modern states. The mechanism here to the extent is one has been military competition. States are more powerful than tribal societies and modern states are more powerful than patrimonial ones, so the relentless quest for security drives societies to adopt meritocracy and impersonal government as organizing principles.

我首先想到的问题就是,经济增长到底是如何开始的。打个比方,如果把经济的增长当做一部上升的扶梯,人们很容易去预测它未来的发展。但是世界上很多地方的发展是陷入贫困之中的,这些地区并没有复制类似日本韩国这样经济腾飞的模式。原因就在于制度保障上的缺乏,特别是现代国家形成条件的缺乏。然而我早期的理论过多的关注在民主的发展上,对于维持社会秩序和提供基本的公共产品的这些客观的先决条件的关注是不足的。要建设这样的一个现代化国家(我把这个过程称为”抵达丹麦“),我现在意识到这是一个更加复杂和艰巨的过程,并不仅仅是实现某种形式的选举民主就可以达到的,我之前大意了。按照我之前的理论,当今世界有资格实行选举民主的国家有100多个,这里面甚至包括阿富汗和伊朗。但是真正意义上的现代国家就是凤毛麟角了。而我之前所提到的东亚地区在经济上之所以成功,是因为他们在和西方文明发生冲撞之前已经发展成了现代国家的形式。他们不必要为了达到现代化来创建那些为之提供保障的机构。但是对于世界上其他地区而言,诸如撒哈拉沙漠以南的国家,现代国家的概念在他们被殖民之前根本就是不存在的,这样看下去,经济的发展没有了这些客观条件的保障就要困难的多了。而这引出了我在1992年的书中完全忽视掉的一个问题,就是关于现代国家的起源。我在之后出版了两卷本的《政治秩序的起源》的书籍,希望能够纠正我之前的观点。这两卷本的书籍从描述部落社会中的国家兴起开始,然后呈现了从世袭制到现代国家的过渡过程。而这个过程在一定程度上其实是一场军事的竞争:正式因为世袭国家比部落更加强大,现代国家又比世袭国家更加强大,因此出于对安全的追求激发了社会向着任人唯贤的组织原则转变。

This hypothesis that state makes war and war makes the state has been associated with sociologist Charles Tilly. It’s neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to explain why states exist in any given country. For that we need to consider other factors like climate, geography, religious beliefs and the like. All of which makes for a more complex and a much more messy overall theory.

这种国家构建和战争相互作用的假设是和社会学家Charles Tilly紧密相关的,但是对于解释为什么在任何国家中均存在政府这就既不是充分也不是必要条件了。对于此,我们还需要考虑诸如气候条件,地理成因,宗教信仰等其他的因素,而这使得整体的理论更加的复杂了。

Thank you for listening. This podcast is produced by Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. Feel free to use it in classrooms and for other educational purposes. Follow us on Twitter, Facebook and Medium.

二 End of History Revisited Part 2

This is Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law podcast. We are studying why governments fail. We are going to talk about economic and political development at home and around the world.

Today we are listening to Francis Fukuyama, the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli institute of Stanford University. Welcome to the CDDRL democracy world.

The second problem with my 1992 formulation is closely related and has to do with the fragility of modern states. Modern states can develop out of less developed ones, but they can also decay, that is modern political orders can regress to something less modern. The central problem with modern state is that it is in some sense very unnatural: the modern state is premised on impersonality and merit. The official you select to run the government should not be your friend or your cousin, but someone who’s qualified for the job. Human sociability works differently to favor friends and family. So there’s a constant temptation to erode the impersonal character of the state or we otherwise called political corruption. The temptation is particularly strong for elites who try to translate their wealth and power into private advantages through their capture of the state. This process I labeled with a very long word “repatrimonialization” in my Political Order series and it has unfolded in every political system that tried to create a modern state. It happened at the end of Han Dynasty in China. It happened to the Ottoman system of slave soldiers and under the old regime in France which created the practice of venal office holding. Something similar is going on in the United States today where variety of elites are taking advantage of the US check and balance political system to veto policies that hurt their interest, leading to overall political paralysis.

第二个问题是和现代政府的脆弱性息息相关的。现代政府可以从欠发达的状态发展而来,但是与此同时它们也有可能衰退,也就是说现代政治秩序可能退化到之前的发展形态。问题的核心在于现代政府从某种意义上来说是和人性相违背的:现代政府的构建是基于客观条件以及功劳的,换句话说,一位政府官员的任命是基于任人唯贤而不是任人唯亲的原则,这和人类的社交性是相违背的。这样一来,就存在政治腐败的问题,而这个问题,对于政治精英尤其明显,他们中的一些试图将公器私用。在我两卷本的《政治起源》书籍中,给了它一个专有名词:repatrimonialization。这一过程普遍存在于现代政府构建的过程之中,比如中国汉朝末期,奥斯曼土耳其帝国的奴隶兵役体系,法国的旧政权。而在当今美国也有类似的情况:一些政治精英正是利用了美国权力制衡的体制来否决那些对他们利益有损害的政策,而从大局来说,这会导致政治体制的瘫痪。

The third challenge to my end of history theory is partly related to the problem of political decay. There is a broad perception in many contemporary liberal democracies that existing elites have gamed systems to their own advantage and are so deeply entrenched that ordinary democratic politics is not sufficient to dislodge them. The resulting political stasis or gridlock then leads to demands for a strong leader who can challenge these elites, even if it means undermining the institutional framework that has defined liberal democracy. Political stasis has become linked to the economic distress of the old middle or working class that had secure employment during the decades immediately following World War II but who in recent decades has seen their incomes and social status is slipping. This has led to a wave of new anti-establishment populist movement throughout the democratic world. Viktor Orbán and Jarosław Kaczyński in Hungary and Poland, to Marine Le Pen in France and Brexit fears in the UK, and of course, to Donald Trump in the United States.

第三个挑战和政治衰败有关。在许多当代自由民主国家中,很大一部分的观点认为政治精英利用制度为他们的私利进行博弈,这种行为是如此的根深蒂固以至于民主体制并不足以对他们做出改变。而由此所产生的政治上的停滞或者僵局又让民众渴望强势领导者的出现,即使这种领导者意味着对自由民主政体的破坏也不足惜。现如今,政治的停滞已经和老一代中产阶级或者工人阶级的经济困境联系在了一起,他们在二战后的几十年间还享受着稳定的就业,但是最近的几十年,他们的收入和社会地位都出现了下降。而这直接导致了民主社会出现了一波反建制的民粹主义运动,包括匈牙利的奥班·维克多,波兰的雅罗斯瓦夫·卡钦斯基,法国的马琳勒庞,英国的脱欧,以及美国的川普。

The fourth challenge to my 1992 hypothesis is the one raised by Huntington himself in his book The Clash of Civilizations in which he argued that liberal democracy is the product of western culture, and not an inevitable part of a universal modernization process.

第四点挑战是亨廷顿在他的文明的冲突一书中所提出来的,他认为自由民主只不过是西方文明的产物,这并不是现代化过程中普适的一部分。

Here China is far and away the biggest challenge to the end of history narrative. Of all the illiberal nondemocratic challengers, I have from the beginning maintain that China is the most serious. Islamism is often raised as another competitor. But I’m reasonably certain that no society governed as Islamic theocracy will ever be able to reach the levels of economic and technological modernity necessary to sustain it as a successful society. Chief evidence for this is that none has come close to doing so yet. The only economically successful places in the Middle East are tiny outposts like Dubai and Qatar that have adopted liberal autocratic political systems. Iran, which led the region into Islamic fundamentalism, is seething on the inside as a new generation of well-educated, young people, longed for a more open and genuinely democratic society. China is different. China remains an illiberal autocracy that has successfully maintaining high levels of growth and is proving that it can master a wide range of technologies necessary to sustain growth into the future. For a while, people question whether such a society can truly innovate as opposed to copying and catching up with the world’s leading economies. But China with its huge and expanding tech sector is out competing its western rivals on a number of fronts. The question then is how sustainable the China model is. No society can be judged by its performance over the short run and there are reasons for thinking that China has serious challenges in the decades ahead. The high levels of growth in recent years have been sustained using extremely high levels of debt. The country has a huge savings rate, its net debt position is not sustainable. Its growth model is based on high levels of infrastructure investment. And that has come to a halt whether this can be exported abroad through the Belt and Road Initiative is questionable. It has privileged economic growth for so long over other goals like environmental protection that has poisoned its own environment. While the government is trying to clean up, it’s not clear it will be able to fix these problems and continue to grow as it has. Finally the legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party remains highly dependent on its performance. The country has not experienced a serious recession since 1978. But economic setbacks are inevitable as it seeks to move into high income status. How will the new middle class in China feel about continued party rule during a long economy downturn. If China in the coming years continues to grow, and remains stable as the world’s largest economic power, then I would say that my 1992 thesis has been conclusively refuted.

在这里,中国的因素是我历史的终结论中最大的挑战。而且我一直都认为,在所有的非民主自由的挑战中,中国是最严峻的。与此同时,伊斯兰经常被认为是另一个同西方文明的竞争对手,但是我有理由相信,依靠伊斯兰神权政治是不可能达到一个成功社会所需要的经济和技术现代化的条件的。这方面的主要证据就是还从来没有一个国家靠此成功过。中东地区的一些小型的前哨国家,诸如卡塔尔或者迪拜,他们在经济上的成功所仰赖的是一种自由专制的政治体制。另一个例子,伊朗,这个伊斯兰原教旨主义国家,其国家内部却正在孕育一批受过良好教育,渴望更加开放和民主社会的年轻人。

但是中国的情况就不同了。中国目前仍然是一个非自由的专制政体,并且成功的保持了高速的经济增长,而且拥有维持未来继续增长所需的各项技术。曾经有人质疑说像中国这种模式是否能够真正的激发创新,而不是通过山寨来和世界上发达的经济体展开竞争。但是现实却是,中国拥有庞大且不断扩张的科技产业,这使得他们能够在很多方面同西方的竞争对手展开竞争。被这个问题打脸之后又提出了新的质疑就是中国模式是可持续的吗?我的观点是不能通过短期的表现来轻易的做出判断,并且有理由相信,中国在未来的几十年中会面对比较严峻的挑战:中国近年高速的经济增长是以极高的债务水平为代价的,中国还拥有巨额的储蓄,这导致其净债务状况的不可持续性。而且它的经济增长模式很大程度上依赖于基建投资,而这种模式是否可以通过一带一路的倡议输出到国外也是存疑的。中国长期的经济增长是以牺牲其他考虑比如环保为代价的,虽然政府也体现出了治理的决心,但是目前来看并不清楚问题是否会得到解决,并且与此同时又能保证经济的增长不会受到影响。最后,中共的合法性目前仍然高度依赖其执政表现,而中国自从1978年之后就再也没有经历过严重的经济衰退,但是经济的起伏是不可避免的。试想一下,如果中国的经济出现长时期的衰退,新兴的中产阶级会如果看待中共的统治。我把话放这儿了,如果中国在未来的几年之间仍然能够保持经济的持续增长,其世界最大经济体的地位依然保持稳定,那么我的观点就完全被驳斥了。

Fifth challenge has to do with technology, actually this is a series of challenges posed by different technologies that are either already visible or are over the Horizon. Given the framework of my original argument and the role of the technological changed played in it, it’s hard to see how there could be an end of History without an end of technological development. I made note of this in my 2001 book Our Posthuman Future in which I argued the possibilities for manipulation of human behavior were expanding in dramatic ways as a result of progress in the life sciences. My hypothesis about the sustainability of liberal democracy rested, in the end, on its compatibility with the human nature. But if that nature could be deliberately altered through genetic engineering or psychotropic drugs then all bets were off. The kinds of social engineering pioneered by the 20th century’s totalitarian regimes were absolutely crude by comparison to what is possible today through biotechnology. This is not the only technological challenge contemporary political systems face. Weapons of mass destruction including biological weapons threaten to undermine the link between the social development and military power, giving small terrorist groups and weak states potent leverage over their more developed rivals. WMDs in a sense return the world to the situation it was in for a number of centuries when nomadic horsemen could defeat the armies of more developed agrarian societies, as a condition that lasted up until the invention of gunpowder. Automation has been widely blamed for job loss in developed economies and is very likely to affect ever higher levels of skill, increasing overall inequality, imposing particular challenges to countries dedicated to the principle of equality. Finally, if there are absolute limits to growth imposed by global warming, resource scarcity, or plateauing productivity enhancing change, then liberal democracies will face special challenges. Market economies produce inequalities that are politically tolerable only to the extent that there is a perception that everyone’s benefiting to some degree. If there’s and end to growth, we may return to the pre-modern Malthusian zero-sum world in which predation rather than the creation of new wealth becomes the easiest route to riches. All of these technological developments are possibilities not certainties and we may yet be surprised at ways in which technological change benefits human development. There’s no finality to this process.

第五个挑战与科技相关,其实这个挑战是由不同的技术所构成的一系列挑战,这些技术要么已经到了应用阶段,要么还处在孕育之中。鉴于我原始理论的框架以及技术在其中所扮演的作用,很难设想如果技术发展没有尽头的话,历史会以何种方式终结。我在2001年的新书中提出了一种可能,就是随着生命科学技术的进步,对人类行为的操纵正在成为可能。我的历史终结的设想是取决于它和人性的相容性的。但是如果基因工程或者精神性药物可以刻意改变人性,那么我的所有假设就没有存在的基石了。20世纪极权主义政体所领衔的社会运动同今天的生物技术相比绝对是小巫见大巫。而这并不是现代政治体制所面临的唯一的技术挑战。

包括生物武器在内的大规模杀伤性武器有可能破坏现存的社会发展阶段和军事力量之间的关联,它们使得小型恐怖组织和欠发达国家有了同其竞争对手同台叫板的筹码。从这个意义上来说,大规模杀伤性武器使得世界的发展一夜之间回到解放前,同几个世纪之前游骑兵可以击败农业文明之下的军队的情况相类似。

而自动化技术在发达经济体中被指责与失业相关,并且极有可能影响到对高水平技能的需求,从而增加整体的不平等,这对于致力于平等原则的国家来说是一种挑战。最后,如果全球变暖,资源短缺这些因素对增长造成限制和挑战,那么又会对民主国家造成新的挑战。市场经济中所产生的不平等是可以在政治制度的层面被允许的,但是前提条件是人们在某种程度上还是有利可图的。但是如果经济的增长出现了停滞,那么我们就可能回到前现代水平的马尔萨斯零和博弈的世界,在这个世界中,取代创新成为创造财富手段的是掠夺。

而我所提出的这些都仅仅是一种可能性而不是确定性。我们当然也可能对技术进步对人类社会发展所起的正面作用感到惊讶,但是这个过程是没有终点的。

There is one last issue, which has to do with the question of identity. Many critics of “the End of History?” failed to note that the original 1989 article had a question mark at the end of it. And they did not read the final chapters of the book version of the End of History and The Last Man. The latter part of the title, the last man, refers to Nietzsche’s men without chests which conditioned he saw the rising at the end of history when human beings were reduced to complacent consumers lacking in pride or aspiration. One of the major themes of the book was the importance of “thumos” as a driver of human history. “Thumos” is a Greek word used by Socrates in the Republic usually translated as “spiritedness” in English that refers to the part of the human personality that craves recognition of one's inner dignity. I identified two different forms of thumos: “isothymia” that sought recognition as an equal to other people and “megalothymia” that desired to be recognized as superior to others. Kojève and Hegel understood the entire historical process as being driven by struggles over dignity and the emergence of the end of history as the victory of the principle of universal and equal recognition.

最后一个挑战和身份政治相关。很多对我理论的批评者没有注意到我1989年发表的论文题目中还有一个问号,而且他们也没有读过书中最后几章的内容。在书标题的后半部分所指出的最后之人,指的是尼采所提出的”没有胸膛的人“,他们看到了随着历史的终结,人类退化到了缺少荣誉感的自满的消费者的地步。我书中的主题之一就是“thumos”作为推动人类历史发展驱动力的重要性的讨论。“Thumos”是一个希腊词汇,是苏格拉底在理想国中使用的,翻译成英语指的是”精神”,说的再具体些,也就是指人性中渴望内在价值和尊严被承认的部分。我把精神分为了两类,“isothymia”寻求同其他人平等地位的认可,而“megalymymia”希望得到与众不同的认可。科耶夫和黑格尔的观点认为,人类历史的进程就是被个人尊严认同的斗争所驱动的,而历史的终结出现之时,也是普遍平等认同原则胜利之日。

Liberal democracies recognize the equal dignity of their citizens by granting them rights to speech, association and political participation, thereby treating them as adults with full human agency. The problem as I noted back in 1992 was that while this kind of universal recognition was a powerful attraction for people living in dictatorships, it was often taken for granted once democracy was achieved. People sought other forms of partial recognition as members of different communities. This was the origin of both nationalism and Islamism as well as a kind of identity politics that has overtaken American universities, a situation that actually existed back in 1992. Modern politics has consisted of a series of struggles for recognition on the part of marginalized groups. Individuals want to see themselves not as generic human beings but as Hungarians, Catalans, Muslims, gays and lesbians, women, African-Americans and so on. In addition, liberal democracies need to channel and tame megalothymia(a desire not just for respect and proportionate recognition, but a need to disproportionately dominate over others in ostentatious and spectacular ways.) that desire for recognition on the part of overwhelmingly ambitious individuals, defending a democratic republic against Caesarism was one of the central concerns of the American Founding Fathers and was one reason for their creation of our current complex system of checks and balances. I did not assert back in 1989 that liberal democracy had solved the problem of thumos where the nationalism or religion would disappear any time soon.

自由民主国家通过赋予自己的公民言论,结社和政治参与的的权利来承认其平等和尊严。我在1992年提出的问题是,虽然这种普世的认同感对于生活在独裁体制下的人来说有一种巨大的吸引力,但是一旦实现了民主,这些内容就会被视作是理所当然的。人们转而去寻求其他形式的身份认同,这也是民族主义和伊斯兰兴起的原因,以及身份政治席卷美国大学的原因。这种状况其实早在1992年的时候就已经存在了。现代政治又包含了一系列处于边缘群体的人群的身份认可的斗争,比如人们并不希望自己只是普通公民,想法他们希望自己身为诸如匈牙利人,加泰罗尼亚人,穆斯林,同性恋,女性,非洲裔美国人等等的身份而获得认同。除此之外,民主政体也要警惕这种浪潮之中所裹挟的不是基于尊重和认可,而是基于支配他人,希望得到对强人认可的思潮,从而去捍卫民主共和政体被类似凯撒的独裁统治所裹挟,而这也是美国的开国之父们集中关注的点,以及他们设计出了现如今这种复杂的制衡制度的原因之一。我在1989年的论文之中并没有断言说自由民主制度已经解决了这其中的问题,从而民族主义或者宗教会很快消失。

In the world that has emerged toward the end of the 2010s, identity has become a unifying theme for many of the new populist nationalist movements that have arisen around the world. This is true not just in new democracies like Hungary and Poland but in older established ones like France and the United States. Islamism in the Middle East can be seen as a variant of the same identity assertion that drove 19th century European nationalism. The prospects for identity issues producing conflict and instability in and between democratic countries is a real and troubling possibility. I have gone through a number of the reasons why the modernization process may not culminate in liberal democracy. Countries may remain poor and unstable, get stuck in autocracy or a liberal democracy or fall backwards to earlier stages of development. All of this may seem like a rather pessimistic view compared to the optimism of the original 1989 article. This is inevitable given the new trends in world politics which are pointing in a different direction from the way they did back in 1992 when Huntington's third wave was just getting into high gear. Nonetheless it is easy to get carried away, extrapolating from short term trends and making them into permanent conditions. If we take a broader look at the State of the world as a whole we see quite a remarkable picture. Over the past two generations and particularly in the period since the writing of the end of history there has been a remarkable human progress.

在2010年代末期,身份认同已经成为了世界各地风起云涌的新民粹主义和民族主义运动的统一主题。这不仅适用于像匈牙利和波兰这样的新兴民主国家,更适用于法国和美国这样的老牌民主国家。中东地区的伊斯兰主义可以被视为是推动19世界欧洲民族主义身份认同运动的一种变体。而在民主国家内部和他们之间产生了冲突和不稳定因素的身份认同问题的前景是一个真实存在且令人感到不安的关切。我已经列举了一系列为什么现代化进程并不必然的导致自由民主的原因:国家可能仍然处于贫穷和不稳定的状态,陷入了专制或者从自由民主制度下发生了衰退。

和我1989年发表的文章中的乐观情绪相比,所有这些因素看起来都是相当悲观的,鉴于世界政治的走向出现了与亨廷顿提出的第三波浪潮刚刚进入高潮时的方式不同的内容,这种情绪是不可避免的。但是如果单单从短期的趋势去推断长时间的改变,确实容易被带跑偏。但是如果我们从更广泛的视角去整体看待世界范围内政府的发展,我们就会看到一幅非常了不起的图景。在之前的两代人的历史中,特别是自从我写下自己的观点以来,人类社会已经经历了非常巨大的变化。

As a result of globalization and the liberal international order that had been created since 1945, the output of the world economy has more than quadrupled and hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of extreme poverty. This is true not just in China but in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America. It's not just incomes that are improving. Other measures of well-being like child mortality, access to education and the status of women and girls have improved dramatically as well. New middle classes have emerged in many countries and the number of democracies has expanded dramatically even if there have been recent reversals. Perhaps the best indication that history has a clear and progressive direction lies in the fact that every year millions of people in poor, chaotic or repressive countries try to move themselves and their families to countries that are at the end of history: that is to rich, stable, democratic places that give them opportunities for individuals flourishing. Hardly anyone voluntarily moves in the opposite direction. Poor and oppressed people are not clamoring to get into China for all of its wealth and success even if China would let them. This movement of people has, of course, created something of a crisis for subtle democracies. We're seeing a backlash against migrants and refugees. But for anyone who does not think that history has a direction or that is not clear where that directionality points, the simple fact of people voting with their feet is something needs to be explained.

随着全球化的浪潮和兴起于1945年代以来的自由国际秩序的建立,世界经济总量增加了四倍多,这使得数亿人摆脱了赤贫,这一状况不仅发生在中国,也发生在撒哈拉沙漠以南的非洲,南亚和拉丁美洲这些地区。而且也不仅仅是人们的收入水平正在得到改善,其他的衡量指标诸如儿童死亡率,受教育的机会,妇女和女童的地位都得到了显著的改善。新兴中产阶级在许多国家出现,并且虽然经历了反复,民主政体的数量也大幅增加。对于历史的发展有清晰的方向这一观点最好的例证也许在于每年都有数百万的人试图从贫穷和混乱的国家流动到更接近历史的终点的国家,在这些富裕,稳定和民主的国家,个人的发展会得到保障。而与此同时,几乎没有人自愿向着相反的方向流动,比如说即使中国愿意提供机会,那些贫穷和受压迫的人也不愿意进入中国去寻求财富和成功。

诚然这种人口的流动也会给民主带来一定的危机,比如我们会看到关于对移民和难民的抵制的消息诉诸报端。但是对于那些并不认为历史的发展有确定的方向的人们来说,他们需要对人们用脚投票这件事情给予合理的解释。

Thank you for listening. This podcast is produced by Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. Feel free to use it in classrooms and for other educational purposes. Follow us on Twitter, Facebook and Medium.

三 Identity and the End of History

This is Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law podcast. We are studying why governments fail. We are going to talk about economic and political development at home and around the world. Welcome to CDDRL democracy world.

This is Francis Fukuyama, Mosbacher Director of Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

This podcast concerns the relationship of identity and the end of history. Since this point has already come up in some social media commentary on my new book Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, I should address from the outset the relationship of this work to what I had written on The End of History. As someone said on social media: Hard to believe that someone who proclaim the end of history 25 years ago now gets to publish on identity as the driving factor on politics. The fact of the matter is that I have been writing about identity consistently over the years beginning with my 1992 book. The title of that work was The End of History and the Last Man. My superficial critics did not bother to read the book and in particular ignored the concluding chapters on the last man.

这讲播客的内容聚焦在历史的终结理论和身份认同的关系上。关于这一点,我注意到已经有一些评论出现在了社交网站上,我觉得有必要从一开始讨论一下两者的关系。正如有人在社交网络上揶揄道:难以置信,一个在25年前宣称历史终结的人,现在居然着手去出版一本论述身份认同作为政治驱动因素的书籍。

而这件事情的事实却是,从我1992年的书籍开始,我就一直在写作关于身份认同的文章。1992年书籍的标题是《历史的终结及最后之人》,那些肤浅的评论并没有深入到书籍的内容之中,甚至忽略了关于最后之人论述的章节。

The latter of course was a reference to Nietzsche’s men without chests that is the docile passionless individuals who emerged at the end of History. They had no chests because they has no pride and that very passionlessness was what would drive a revolt against the modern world. The fundamental defect of our modern prosperous democratic world I said back in 1992 was its failure to address the problem of “thumos”. Thumos is a Greek word usually translated into English as “spiritedness” which Socrates discusses in the book The Republic, which is a part of the human personality that demands recognition of one’s inner dignity and the seat of the emotions of pride, anger and shame. Thumos are argued following G.W.F. Hegel, has been the primary driver of the entire human historical process.

而后者引用自尼采的“没有胸膛的人”的概念,这一概念所指的是在历史的终结之时出现的一种温顺无情感的人。他们没有胸膛的原因在于他们没有荣誉感,而且那种无助感也会引发对现代世界的反抗。我在1992年的书中所论述的现代民主社会的根本缺陷在于它未能解决Thumos这个问题,Thumos这个词语翻译成英语意为“精神”,苏格拉底在理想国一书中对其有过讨论。更具体的解释就是人类精神世界中对个人尊严得到承认的需求,也是诸如骄傲,愤怒,羞耻这些情绪产生的地方。黑格尔则认为其是整个人类历史发展的主要推动力量。

In my 1992 book, I distinguish between two manifestations of thumos which I labeled “isothymia” and “megalothymia”. The former is the desire to be recognized as the equal of the other people and it is the emotion underlying much of the modern identity politics. Identity politics began to take off in the 1960s following the major social movement that emerged then, built around the marginalization of different groups and society: racial minorities, women, gays and lesbians, the disabled and so on. The central demand was equal recognition of their dignity together with a substantive redress of their social condition. Megalothymia, by contrast, was the demand of certain individuals to be recognized as superior to others. Liberal democracies were designed in part to contain megalothymia: the American founding fathers devised a complex constitutional system of checks and balances to prevent a would-be Caesar from centralizing power, as the historical Caesar had done at the end of the Roman Republic. As James Madison said, ambition was needed to counter ambition. I actually mentioned Donald Trump back in my 1992 book, presenting him as an example of a hugely ambitious individual whose energies had been, it seemed at the time, safely diverted into entrepreneurship. Little did I know back then that this wouldn’t be enough for him.

我在1992年的书中用了两个词来划分thumos,我将其标记为“isothymia”和“megalothymia”。前者所指是被认为和其他人平等的愿望,这一点存在于大多数现代身份政治之中,身份政治出现在1960年代,伴随着那时候的社会运动而出现,围绕着不同的边缘化群体诸如少数族裔,妇女,男女同性恋者,残疾人等。他们的中心诉求是对其身份的平等认同并且对他们当时所处社会地位的一种补偿;而相比之下,后者是指被认为高人一等与众不同的愿望。自由民主政体的设计原则之一就是为了遏制这种思潮,例如美国的开国元勋就设计了一套复杂的制衡制度以防止类似凯撒式的集权的出现,正如詹姆斯麦迪逊所说,野心需要通过野心来实现制衡。而我实际上在1992年的书中举了川普的例子,把他当做是一个野心勃勃的人,在当时看来,他的精力集中在了商业上,但是对于当时的我万万没想到的是,集中在商业领域对于他的野心来说是完全不够的。

I stated in The End of History and the Last Man that neither nationalism nor religion were about to disappear as powerful forces in the modern world. As I explain in my new book, both can be seen as thematic demands for recognition. The stability of modern liberal democracy is threatened by the fact that it does not fully solve the problem of thumos either of its manifestation. Modern liberal democracy promised universal recognition of the dignity of its citizens, but frequently failed to deliver on these promises. Moreover, not everyone is satisfied with universal recognition: people want recognition of their particular identities and the groups to which they feel bound, particularly if they have suffered a history of marginalization. That’s what’s driving the Black Lives Matter and the #MeToo movements today. Demands for particularistic recognition can also take the form of nationalists or Islamists defending the dignity of their communities, or of ambitious demagogues like Donald Trump.

我在1992年的书中指出,民族主义抑或是宗教这种强大的力量在现代世界中并不会凭空消失。正如我在新书中所解释的那样,这两者都可以被看做是身份认同的需求。现代自由民主体制的稳定性被这样一个事实所威胁:它并没解决身份认同所带来的问题。现代自由民主政体对公民承诺了对其身份的认同,但是在实践层面却打了折扣。此外,众口难调,并不是所有人都对普遍意义上的身份认同感到满意,有些人希望对自己所属的小众的身份和组织的认同,这种渴求对于遭受了边缘化对待的人来说尤其强烈。这也是美国今天推动诸如黑命贵运动和米兔运动的动力所在。而这种对于特殊身份认同的需求还可以通过民族主义或者伊斯兰主义者捍卫自己的社区的方式来达到,或者像川普这样通过煽动的方式达成。

For the record, I have obviously modified many of the views I expressed back in 1989 or 1992. The End of History was written at the mid-point of what Samuel Huntington labeled the Third Wave of democratization, and for the past decade we have clearly been in what my colleague Larry Diamond labels a “democratic recession.” I still believe that history is directional and progressive, and that the modernization process points to liberal democracy as its fullest embodiment. But getting there is harder than I believed in 1992, and the possibility of institutional decay is ever-present. My two volumes The Origins of Political Order and Political Order and Political Decay should be seen an effort to rewrite The End of History and the Last Man based on what I now understand about global politics. I will provide a fuller account of this rethinking in a different podcast. Thank you.

很明显,对于我在1989或者1992年所提出的理论,我已经做出了许多修改。历史的终结写作于亨廷顿所谓的第三波浪潮风起云涌之时,但是在过去的十年中,我们也清楚的目睹了民主衰退的过程。我依然对历史的发展有方向性的观点以及现代化的进程指向的是自由民主最充分的体现的观点充满信心。但是和1992年相比,到达目的地所需要的实践变得更难了,而且政治体制衰退的可能始终存在。我两卷本的政治秩序的起源系列图书可以被看成是我基于目前对于全球政治的理解而做出的对于历史终结论的最新理解。我将会在另一个播客中做出更全面的介绍。(福山在9月27日做客Ezra Klein Show,详谈对新书的看法,并且推荐了两本关于民主政治中不理性成分的书籍,时长一个半小时)

Thank you for listening. This podcast is produced by Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. Feel free to use it in classrooms and for other educational purposes. Follow us on Twitter, Facebook and Medium.

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