《中国新疆的压迫制度是如何发展？我们又要如何遏制它？》参考文献

参考文献

1 James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 212.

2 Bingtuan recruitment ads appear frequently on Xinjiang job websites such as “事业单位招聘考试网” [Work unit recruitment exam net],http://www.shiyebian.net/xinjiang/. For example, there were 19 Bingtuan listings onthe Sheyebian website on September 4, 2020,archived at https://web.archive.org/save/http://www.shiyebian.net/xinjiang/.

3 Alex Bate, “U.S.-Sanctioned Xinjiang Paramilitary Has Over 800,000 Holdings Worldwide,” Sayari, August 4,2020,https://sayari.com/blog/u-s-sanctioned-xinjiang-paramilitary-has-over-800000-holdings-worldwide/. On Bingtuan historical and current involvement in forced labor at all tiers of the cotton apparel industry, see Amy Lehr, “Addressing Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Toward a Shared Agenda,”(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 30, 2020) https://www.csis.org/analysis/addressing-forced-labor-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-toward-shared-agenda.

4  “Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order,”U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 31, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073;Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “U.S. sanctions China’s paramilitary in Xinjiang,” Axios, July 31, 2020, https://www.axios.com/us-sanctions-china-paramilitary-xinjiang-xpcc-41e29c92-9649-4e47-9e91-a7f78330d4d8.html.

5 Bao Yajun, “The Xinjiang Production Construction Corps: An Insider’s Perspective,” originally published online in January 2018 as part of the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government’s working papers series (BSG-WP-2018/023). A significantly altered version was published as Bao Yajun, “The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps: An Insiders Perspective,” China: An International Journal 18, no. 2 (May 2020): 161-174,https://muse.jhu.edu/article/756368. The journal-published version lacks some of the specific data included in the original. It states that the Bingtuan was restored in 1981 (after being dissolved during the Cultural Revolution)“due partly to the rise of the Islamic Resistance Movement in Afghanistan” (163), a reference to Islam and Afghanistan which Bao did not make in the original version. The 2020 version cuts Bao’s discussion of the degree to which Bingtuan recruitment of Han Chinese from eastern China is directly subsidized by the central government and elides his note that “in recent years” 90% of the XPCC budget consists of central government financial support” (16), a figure which underscores how Beijing uses the Bingtuan, despite its vast economic inefficiencies, to promote Han settler colonialism in Xinjiang. The original 2018 version, removed in summer 2020 from the University of Oxford website, has now been republished on Academic.edu:https://www.academia.edu/44022879/Bao_Yajun_The_Xinjiang_Production_and_Construction_Corps_An_Insiders_Perspective_.Millward can also provide a copy of the 2018 version to interested scholars who inquire at millwarj@georgetown.edu.

6  On the PRC regime and its 1990s policies see Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) and James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, chapters 6-7. On the Bingtuan, see Tom Cliff, Oil and Water: Being Han in Xinjiang (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016) and Greg Fay, The Bingtuan: China’s Paramilitary Colonizing Force in East Turkestan (Washington, DC: Uyghur Human Rights Project, April 2018), https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/bingtuan.pdf. On the background to the 1997 Ghulja incident, see Jay Dautcher, Down a Narrow Road: Identity and Masculinity in a Uyghur Community in Xinjiang China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

7  On the argument that the designation of ETIM was meant to court PRC support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441justifying the George W. Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq, see Erik Eckholm, “U.S. Labeling of Group in China as Terrorist Is Criticized,” The New York Times, September 13, 2002, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/13/world/us-labeling-of-group-in-china-as-terrorist-is-criticized.html; James Dao, “THREATS AND RESPONSES: DIPLOMACY; Closer Ties With China May Help U.S. on Iraq,” The New York Times, October 4, 2002, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/04/world/threats-and-responses-diplomacy-closer-ties-with-china-may-helpus-on-iraq.html; Karen DeYoung, “U.S. and China Ask U.N. to List Separatists as Terror Group,” The Washington Post, September 11, 2002, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/09/11/us-and-china-askun-to-list-separatists-as-terror-group/a3adaa3e-2cd3-4861-b544-eac800757255/. A State Department official speaking on background with one of the authors (Millward) in late 2002 confirmed that the ETIM designation was part of the campaign to gain PRC support. ETIM was a small group based in Afghanistan, previously unknown to most Xinjiang specialists. The PRC had included ETIM in a white paper cataloging a number of “‘East Turkistan’ terrorist forces” and alleging that these forces had committed 200 terrorist attacks, causing 162 deaths and over 440 injuries, between 1990 and 2001, although the document actually described many fewer incidents and the death and casualty tolls of events described in the document do not add up to these totals. The white paper associated few acts with specific named groups, and did not allege that ETIM was responsible for any of the acts. See State Council Information Office, People’s Republic of China, “‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, January 21, 2002, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t34101.htm. However, the U.S. State Department statement designating ETIM a terrorist group attributed all 200 attacks, 162 deaths, and 440 injuries to ETIM — and thus the idea of an organized, international, and deadly Uyghur terrorist organization was born. See Philip P. Pan,“U.S. Warns Of Plot by Group in W. China,” The Washington Post, August 29, 2002, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/08/29/us-warns-of-plot-by-group-in-w-china/5607dd9b-9d70-419a-8bac1f3b39e12bc9/. The PRC language, as mis-copied by the U.S. statement, was subsequently reiterated in the U.N.designation of ETIM as a terrorist group. “Press Statement on the UN Designation of The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 12, 2002, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/po3415.aspx. See James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 340, and Sean R. Roberts, The War on the Uyghurs: China’s Internal Campaign against a Muslim Minority (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020), 78-80. Earlier studies must be treated with extreme caution, if not entirely discounted, as many are based on the original uncorroborated PRC white paper or the mistaken State Department statement.

8  Sean R. Roberts, The War on the Uyghurs, 85-86, 141. See also Sean R. Roberts, “China’s hidden partner in suppressing the Muslim Uighurs – the US,” The Guardian, June 24, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/24/china-suppressing-muslim-uighurs-us-trump-9-11.

9  Daniel L. Byman and Israa Saber, “Is China prepared for global terrorism? Xinjiang and beyond,” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, September 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-china-prepared-forglobal-terrorism/.

10 In 1992 and 1997 there were bus bombings in Ürümqi about which we know little.

11 In 2011, Xinjiang authorities launched “Project Beauty,” a campaign discouraging veils, hijab, and other kinds of face and hair coverings worn by Uighur women. In 2015, the standing committee of the Ürümqi People’s Congress illegalized clothing “items that mask the face or robe the body in public places.” Timothy Grose, “Beautifying Uyghur Bodies: Fashion, ‘Modernity’, and State Power in the Tarim Basin,” The Contemporary China Centre Blog, University of Westminster, October 11, 2019, http://blog.westminster.ac.uk/contemporarychina/beautifying-uyghur-bodies-fashion-modernity-and-state-power-in-the-tarim-basin-2/.

12  Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici, “Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang,” International Security 44, no. 3 (Winter 2019/2020): 9-47, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec_a_00368. Sean R. Roberts in The War on the Uyghurs, published after Greitens, Lee, and Yazici’s article, shows that the ETIM of the early 2000s and the Uyghurs who fled Xinjiang from 2010 were unconnected organizationally. Uyghurs who had been active in Syria whom Roberts interviewed had never heard of ETIM. Roberts also argues that the few thousand Uyghurs in Syria, many of them women and children, were extremely unlikely to return to China; he does acknowledge, however, that fear of their potential may be common among Chinese people generally and within the state bureaucracy below those highest levels privy to the best intelligence. Sean R. Roberts, The War on the Uyghurs, 196-197.

13 Sean R. Roberts, “China’s hidden partner in suppressing the Muslim Uighurs – the US.” Roberts provides full background and documentation underlying this essay in his book, The War on the Uyghurs.

14  James Leibold, “China’s treatment of Uighurs is cultural genocide,” Asia Times, July 28, 2019, https://asiatimes.com/2019/07/chinas-treatment-of-uighurs-is-cultural-genocide/; Editorial, “What’s happening in Xinjiang is genocide,” The Washington Post, July 6, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/globalopinions/whats-happening-in-xinjiang-is-genocide/2020/07/06/cde3f9da-bfaa-11ea-9fdd-b7ac6b051dc8_story.html.

15 Xinjiang has among the lowest average incomes, lowest life expectancy, and highest infant and maternal mortality rates of any place in China (maternal mortality rates in 2014 were five times the PRC national average, second only to Tibet). Southern Xinjiang, and other places where the Uyghur population is densest, is far poorer than the Xinjiang average. Ethnicity (Han or non-Han) is the strongest predictor of health outcomes: the greater the Han population in a locale, the better the outcomes. Yuhui Li, China’s Assistance Program in Xinjiang: A Sociological Analysis (New York: Lexington Books, 2018), 103-06. Regarding the failures of development, see also Ilham Tohti, “Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region: Overview and Recommendations,” trans. Cindy Carter, Ilham Tohti Initiative, September 2016, https://ilhamtohtisite.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/ilham-tohti_present-day-ethnic-problems-in-xinjiang-uighur-autonomous-regionoverview-and-recommendations_complete-translation3.pdf. Regarding intensified securitization and assimilative policies, see Darren Byler, “Spirit Breaking: Uyghur Dispossession, Culture Work and Terror Capitalism in a Chinese Global City,” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 2018), https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/42946/Byler_washington_0250E_19242.pdf; David Tobin, Securing China’s Northwest Frontier: Identity and Insecurity in Xinjiang (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,2020). Regarding Uyghur birthrate suppression, see “China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization,”Associated Press, June 29, 2020, https://apnews.com/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c; Adrian Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang,” (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, June 2020), https://jamestown.org/product/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birthrates-in-xinjiang/.

16 Yuhui Li, China’s Assistance Program in Xinjiang: A Sociological Analysis (New York: Lexington Books, 2018), 132-33.

17  Agence France-Presse, “Ghost cities haunt stability dream in China’s far west,” South China Morning Post, September

4, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2109555/ghost-cities-hauntstability-dream-chinas-far-west.

18 Yuhui Li, China’s Assistance Program in Xinjiang, especially 134-39.

19  Paul Mozur and Nicole Perlroth, “China’s Software Stalked Uighurs Earlier and More Widely, Researchers Learn,” The New York Times, July 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/technology/china-uighurshackers-malware-hackers-smartphones.html.

20  Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Securitizing Xinjiang: Police Recruitment, Informal Policing and Ethnic Minority Co-optation,” The China Quarterly 242, no. (June 2020), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/securitizing-xinjiang-police-recruitment-informal-policing-and-ethnic-minority-cooptation/FEEC613414AA33A0353949F9B791E733; James Leibold, “Surveillance in China’s Xinjiang Region: Ethnic Sorting, Coercion, and Inducement,” Journal of Contemporary China 29, no. 121 (2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2019.1621529.

21 Although usually translated as “Integrated Joint Operations Platform,” the Chinese term specifies 作战，i.e. war-making or military operations. It is significant that the system feeding “students” into the so-called vocational training program is designated a military system created by a defense conglomerate.

22  Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrest by Algorithm,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/. An IJOP bulletin instructed officials that “if it is not possible at the moment to eliminate suspicion, it is necessary to put [the suspect] in concentrated training and further screen and review.” Scilla Alecci, “How China Targets Uighurs ‘One by One’ for Using a Mobile App,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-china-targets-uighurs-one-byone-for-using-a-mobile-app/. See also Maya Wang, “China’s Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 1, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/02/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass.

23 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrest by Algorithm.”

24  “‘Integrated Joint Operations Platform’ Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 14,” Integrated Joint Military Operations Platform, June 25, 2017, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558506-China-Cables-IJOP-DailyBulletin-14-English.html. Document published by International Consortium of Investigative Journalists as part of“The China Cables,” https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/. Original Chinese version: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558505-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-Chinese.html.

25 Darren Byler, “Spirit Breaking,” 47.

26  Emily Feng, “‘Illegal Superstition’: China Jails Muslims For Practicing Islam, Relatives Say,” NPR, October 8, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/10/08/764153179/china-has-begun-moving-xinjiang-muslim-detaineesto-formal-prisons-relatives-say. Data drawn from the PRC and Xinjiang statistical yearbooks, court records,and other sources. Given the 99% conviction rate in Chinese courts, we can assume that 300,000 additional prosecutions equates to approximately 300,000 more convicts in prison.

27  Adrian Zenz, “‘Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude’: China’s political re-education campaign in Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey 38, no. 1 (September 2018), 102-128, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997.

28 Adrian Zenz calculated the initial estimates of numbers interned on the basis of camp size, local quotas,and Chinese documents. Ibid. In February 2018, a Uyghur activist media outlet in Turkey released a document it says was leaked by a “believable member of the security services on the ground” in Xinjiang. The document, dating from late 2017 or early 2018, tabulates precise numbers of internees in county-level detention centers,amounting to 892,329 (it excluded municipal-level administrative units, notably the large cities of Ürümqi,Khotan, and Yining). Naoko Mizutani “水谷尚子, “ウイグル絶望収容所の収監者数は89万人以上” [" [The number of internees in Uyghur despair camps exceeds 890,000], Newsweek Japan, March 13, 2018, https://www.newsweekjapan.jp/stories/world/2018/03/89-3_1.php. Though the document’s provenance cannot be confirmed, if genuine it supports the estimates of a million or more total internees. Randall Schriver, then assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense, estimated that up to three million Xinjiang Muslims were interned in the camps. Phil Stewart, “China putting minority Muslims in ‘concentration camps,’ U.S. says,” Reuters, May 3, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usachina-concentrationcamps/china-putting-minority-muslims-in-concentration-camps-us-says-idUSKCN1S925K.These figures and figures quoted in media accounts generally do not include over 300,000 newly put in prison in 2017-2018, though they are also victims of the algorithm-aided round-up of supposed extremists. Shawn Zhang and other researchers gathered further evidence of the internment system’s scale from satellite images and coordinates from Google Earth and other open sources. Journalists were able to confirm the identification of sites as internment camps by visiting some of them on the ground. See Shawn Zhang, “List of Re-education Camps in Xinjiang 新疆再教育集中营列表,” Medium, May 20, 2018,https://medium.com/@shawnwzhang/listof-re-education-camps-in-xinjiang-新疆再教育集中营列表-99720372419c; Shawn Zhang, “Xinjiang Re-education Camps List by Cities,” Medium, May 20, 2019, https://medium.com/@shawnwzhang/xinjiang-re-educationcamps-list-by-cities-f4ed0a6e095a; and other photo essays posted on by Zhang on Medium, https://medium.com/@shawnwzhang. A more extensive BuzzFeed News investigation identified through satelite imagery 268 compounds with prison features built since 2017 in Xinjiang and through other sources verified 92 of these as detention centers. Megha Rajagapolan, Alison Killing, and Christo Buschek, “China Secretly Built A Vast New Infrastructure To Imprison Muslims,” BuzzFeed News, August 27, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/china-new-internment-camps-xinjiang-uighurs-muslims.

29  Nicole Bozorgmir and Isobel Yeung, “Uighur Parents Say China Is Ripping Their Children Away and Brainwashing Them,” Vice, July 1, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7xgj5y/these-uighur-parents-saychina-is-ripping-their-children-away-and-brainwashing-them. Official statistics for Khotan (Hotan) prefecture show an abrupt increase from approximately 400 kindergartens in 2011-2016 to approximately 1,200 in 2017.

30  “Xinjiang Authorities Secretly Transferring Uyghur Detainees to Jails Throughout China,” Radio Free Asia,October 2, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/transfer-10022018171100.html. One of the authors (Millward) received an account written by a witness to the arrival in Sichuan of a bus caravan of prisoners from Xinjiang.

31 For more on the punishments for having “too many” children, see “China cuts Uighur births with IUDs,abortion, sterilization,” Associated Press.

32  Maya Wang, “‘Eradicating Ideological Viruses’,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 9,2018),https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repressionagainst-xinjiangs; “China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization,” Associated Press; Adrian Zenz,“Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control.”

33  Zhu Hailun, “Opinion on further strengthening and standardizing vocational skills education and training centers work,” Autonomous Region State Organ Telegram, 2017, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510-China-Cables-Telegram-English.html. Document published by International Consortium of Investigative Journalists as part of “The China Cables.” Original Chinese version: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558509-China-Cables-Telegram-Chinese.html.

34  The Pairing Assistance Program and techno-oppressive surveillance / internment / forced labor system are thoroughly intermeshed. The first cases of Western companies reported to be relying on Uyghur forced labor, Badger Sportswear and Costco, were found to be supplying from factories in a new industrial park built by Beijing in Khotan (Hetian) under the Pairing Assistance Program and run by the Chinese firm Hetian Taida.Juozapas Bagdonas, “Tracking Down the Fruits of Xinjiang’s Forced Labor Industry,” The Diplomat, November 16, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/tracking-down-the-fruits-of-xinjiangs-forced-labor-industry/. The website of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Development and Reform Commission boasted on December 5, 2019 that “with vocational skill educational training centers [i.e. internment camps] as the vehicle, [our policies] have attracted a large number of coastal enterprises from eastern China to invest and build factories,which has powerfully expanded employment and promoted income growth.” “自治区经济结构稳中有活 发展良好” [The economic structures of the Autonomous Region are lively within stability and development is excellent], 新疆维吾尔自治区发展和改革委员会 [Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Development and Reform Commission], December 5, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20190520143306/http:/www.xjdrc.gov.cn/info/9923/23516.htm. Adrian Zenz compiles voluminous evidence of the connections between the Pairing Assistance Program and the surveillance / internment / forced labor system in Xinjiang. Adrian Zenz, “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,”Journal of Political Risk 7, no. 12 (December 2019), https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-campsbeijings-longterm-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-alleviation-and-social-control-in-xinjiang/.

35 “喀什地区困难群体就业培训工作实施方案” [Implementation program for Kashgar region impoverished groups’ employment and job training], August 7, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20181204024839/http://kashi.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=2963, cited in Adrian Zenz, “Beyond the Camps,” 9.

36  Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Nathan Ruser, “Uyghurs for sale: ‘Reeducation’, forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang,” (Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute,March 1, 2020), https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale.

37 Adrian Zenz, “Beyond the Camps,” 17.

38  For example, “Path to Prosperity: Localized factories lift Xinjiang locals out of poverty,” CGTN, May 8, 2020,https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-08/Localized-factories-lift-Xinjiang-locals-out-of-poverty-QkbViBZI6Q/index.html.

39  Global cotton production has ranged between 25 and 27 million tons in recent years. China produced 5.9 million tons in 2019, and “more than 5 million” tons were grown in Xinjiang, 89% of China’s total. “Top 10 Cotton Producing Countries in the World,” Discover Natural Fibres Initiative, July 1, 2020, https://dnfi.org/cotton/top10-cotton-producing-countries-in-the-world_4785/; Mao Weihua and Zheng Caixioing, “Xinjiang still China’s largest cotton producer in 2019,” China Daily, January 8, 2020, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202001/08/WS5e156c70a310cf3e3558336b.html.

40  Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Nathan Ruser, “Uyghurs for sale”; Eva Dou and Chao Deng, “Western Companies Get Tangled in China’s Muslim Clampdown,” The Wall Street Journal, May 16,2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/western-companies-get-tangled-in-chinas-muslim-clampdown-11558017472.As the authors completed drafting this article, the Caterpillar corporation was reported to be selling clothing made with Xinjiang forced labor. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exclusive: Caterpillar sourced clothes from Xinjiang factory involved in coercive labor,” Axios, June 29, 2020, https://www.axios.com/caterpillar-xinjiang-uighur-labor-a6ec73dfb75e-4aea-ae76-cc8182ad6a3c.html.

41  Peggy Sito, “Esquel Group, garment supplier to Tommy Hilfiger and Nike, says it’s seeking to overturn US sanction on its Xinjiang plant,” South China Morning Post, July 21, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3094073/esquel-group-garment-supplier-tommy-hilfiger-and-nike-says-its-seeking; “Divestment of Xinjiang White Field Farming Co. Ltd.,” Esquel Group, May 13, 2020, https://www.esquel.com/news/divestment-xinjiang-white-field-farming-co-ltd.

42  Danielle Cave, Fergus Ryan, and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, “Mapping more of China’s tech giants: AI and surveillance,”(Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 28, 2019), https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-more-chinas-tech-giants; Dahlia Peterson and Josh Rudolph, “Sharper Eyes: Shandong to Xinjiang,” China Digital Times, September 13, 2019, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2019/09/sharper-eyes-shandong-to-xinjiangpart-3.

43  Darren Byler, “The Global Implications of ‘Re-education’ Technologies in Northwest China,” (Washington,DC: Center for Global Policy, June 8, 2020), https://cgpolicy.org/articles/the-global-implications-of-re-educationtechnologies-in-northwest-china; Danielle Cave,Fergus Ryan, and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, “Mapping more of China’s tech giants.”

44  Placement on the Entity List means companies are subject to additional license requirements and limited availability of most license exceptions for exports, reexports, and in-country transfers to entities on the list. See “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List,” Federal Register, October 9, 2019, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/09/2019-22210/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list; Amy K. Lehr and Efthimia Maria (“Mariefaye”) Bechrakis, “The United States Blacklisted 28 Chinese Entities over Repression of Muslim Minorities in Xinjiang. What Does This Mean for Human Rights?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 11,2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-blacklisted-28-chinese-entities-over-repression-muslim-minoritiesxinjiang.

45 “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List,” Federal Register.

46  AFP, “China’s blacklisted AI firms: what you should know,” Bangkok Post, October 13, 2019, https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1771179/chinas-blacklisted-ai-firms-what-you-should-know.

47  “Commerce Department to Add Nine Chinese Entities Related to Human Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region to the Entity List,” U.S. Department of Commerce, May 22, 2020, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/05/commerce-department-add-nine-chinese-entities-related-human-rights.

48  “Commerce Department to Add Nine Chinese Entities Related to Human Rights Abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region to the Entity List,” U.S. Department of Commerce; Simon Glover, “BCI slammed for refusing to quit Xinjiang,” EcoTextile News, January 29, 2020, https://www.ecotextile.com/2020012925609/materialsproduction-news/bci-slammed-for-refusing-to-quit-xinjiang.html.

49  The national team was first launched in November 2017 with five members, and has since expanded to 15 total. See Jeffrey Ding, “China’s AI “National Team,” ChinAI, May 20, 2019, https://chinai.substack.com/p/chinai-51-chinas-ai-national-team; “科技部扩容‘AI国家队’名单，十家新公司入选” [The Ministry of Science and Technology expands the list of ‘AI National Team,’ 10 new companies are selected], 电子工程专辑 [EE Times China], August 30, 2019, https://www.eet-china.com/news/201908301010.html.

50  Gregory C. Allen, “Understanding China’s AI Strategy” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security,February 6, 2019),https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/understanding-chinas-ai-strategy.

51  Charles Rollet, “In China’s Far West, Companies Cash in on Surveillance Program That Targets Muslims,”Foreign Policy, June 13, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/13/in-chinas-far-west-companies-cash-in-onsurveillance-program-that-targets-muslims.

52  A big contributor to the discrepancy between Hikvision and Dahua’s shares of the $1.2 billion is Dahua winning the $686 million Safe County project for Yarkant County, the location of the July 2014 rioting. See Charles Rollet, “Dahua and Hikvision Win Over $1 Billion In Government-Backed Projects In Xinjiang,” IPVM, April 23, 2018, https://ipvm.com/reports/xinjiang-dahua-hikvision.

53 Charles Rollet, “In China’s Far West, Companies Cash in on Surveillance Program That Targets Muslims.”

54  Charles Rollet, “Evidence Of Hikvision’s Involvement With Xinjiang IJOP And Re-Education Camps,” IPVM, October 2, 2018, https://ipvm.com/reports/hikvision-xinjiang.

55  “Hikvision: PRC Government ‘Exert Significant Influence Over Our Business,’” IPVM, March 28, 2018,https://ipvm.com/reports/hikvision-influence.

56  Charles Rollet, “Evidence Of Hikvision’s Involvement With Xinjiang IJOP And Re-Education Camps”; “How Mass Surveillance Works in Xinjiang, China,” Human Rights Watch, May 2, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/videophotos/interactive/2019/05/02/china-how-mass-surveillance-works-xinjiang; The CETC subsidiary, Hebei Far East Communication System Engineering Company, and 16 other entities tied to CETC had already been placed on the Entity List in August 2018 for “illicit procurement of commodities and technologies for unauthorized military end-use in China.” See “Addition of Certain Entities; and Modification of Entry on the Entity List,” Federal Register, August 1, 2018,https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/08/01/2018-16474/addition-ofcertain-entities-and-modification-of-entry-on-the-entity-list.

57 Charles Rollet, “Evidence Of Hikvision’s Involvement With Xinjiang IJOP and Re-Education Camps.”

58 The expos were the 4th China-Asia-Europe Security Expo and the 13th Xinjiang Police Anti-Terrorism Technical Equipment Expo. See “共筑平安新疆 云从科技携人脸识别亮相亚欧安防展览会” [Building safety in Xinjiang: CloudWalk Technology debuts face recognition at the Asia-Europe Security Exhibition], CTI Forum, August 24, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20200623203839/http://www.ctiforum.com/news/guonei/519237.html; “商汤、旷视、云从、依图，究竟谁将在人脸识别领域独领风骚?” [Sensetime, Megvii,Cloudwalk, Yitu, who will be the leader in face recognition?], 新鲜事研究社 [What’s New Research], May 19,2013,https://web.archive.org/web/20200623212409/https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1633414565832463606&wfr=spider&for=pc.

59 “云天励飞“深目”动态人像识别解决方案将亮相亚欧安博会” [Intellifusion’s ‘Deep Eye’ Dynamic Portrait Recognition Solution Will Debut at Asia-Europe Expo], 中国安防展览网 [China Security Exhibition Network],August 8, 2017, https://archive.vn/OZkfO.

60 Cao Yiqing, “从依图科技看中国AI的弯道超越” [Seeing the Acceleration of Chinese AI from Yitu Technology’s Perspective], Yu De, October 11, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200623212059/https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1647058344062254767&wfr=spider&for=pc.

61  The “focus personnel” label is likely similar to the seven groups of “focus personnel” highlighted by Human Rights Watch: petitioners, those who “undermine stability,” those who are involved in terrorism, major criminals,those involved with drugs, wanted persons, and those with mental health problems who “tend to cause disturbances.” See “China: Police ‘Big Data’ Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent,” Human Rights Watch,November 19, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/19/china-police-big-data-systems-violate-privacytarget-dissent.

62  Darren Byler, “The Global Implications of ‘Re-education’ Technologies in Northwest China”; Meiya Pico was also responsible for the intrusive spying app MFSocket. Celia Chen and Meng Jing, “What you need to know about Meiya Pico, China’s low-profile forensics champion named in data privacy scandal,” South China Morning Post, July 9, 2019,

https://www.scmp.com/tech/start-ups/article/3017688/what-you-need-know-about-meiyapico-chinas-low-profile-forensics.

63 Danielle Cave, Fergus Ryan, and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, “Mapping more of China’s tech giants.”

64 “‘实体清单’事项 海康威视、大华股份最新、全面回应” [Hikvision, Dahua share their latest and comprehensive response to the ‘Entity List’], 中国安防行业网 [China Security Industry Network], October 10,2019,

https://web.archive.org/web/20200623220513/http://news.21csp.com.cn/c34/201910/11389485.html.

65  Jane Zhang, “China’s AI champions are already powering a mind-boggling array of processes and this will rise in 2020,” South China Morning Post, January 1, 2020,

https://www.scmp.com/tech/start-ups/article/3044188/chinas-ai-champions-are-already-powering-mind-boggling-array.

66  “Divestment of Xinjiang White Field Farming Co. Ltd.,” Esquel Group. Increased scrutiny on Esquel’s exports of U.S. technology might endanger the company’s access to robotics, a strategic direction the company has announced. Ryan Swift, “Hong Kong shirtmaker Esquel turns to robots to beat US tariffs,” South China Morning Post, September 25, 2018,

https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2165582/hong-kongshirtmaker-esquel-turns-robots-beat-us-tariffs.

67 Ryan Swift, “Hong Kong shirtmaker Esquel turns to robots to beat US tariffs.”

68  This includes one of the 11 Dahua and Hikvision Xinjiang projects highlighted by IPVM worth $1.2 billion.Leon was one of the awardees alongside Dahua in the Qiemo Safe County project in 2017. See Charles Rollet,“Dahua and Hikvision Win Over $1 Billion In Government-Backed Projects In Xinjiang”; Jeffrey Ding, “Complicit- China’s AI Unicorns and the Securitization of Xinjiang,” ChinAI, September 23, 2018,

https://chinai.substack.com/p/chinai-newsletter-29-complicit-chinas-ai-unicorns-and-the-securitization-of-xinjiang.

69 Jeffrey Ding, “Complicit - China’s AI Unicorns and the Securitization of Xinjiang.”

70  Masha Borak, “China’s ‘data doors’ scoop up information straight from your phone,” South China Morning Post, May 7, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/abacus/tech/article/3029333/chinas-data-doors-scoopinformation-straight-your-phone.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73  For more on how Thermo Fisher enabled biometric surveillance in China, see Sui-Lee Wee, “China is Collecting DNA from Tens of Millions of Men and Boys, Using U.S. Equipment,” The New York Times, June 17,2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/world/asia/China-DNA-surveillance.html.

74  These hardware solutions include GPUs and FPGAs. See Lorand Laskai and Helen Toner, “Can China Grow Its Own AI Tech Base?,” New America, November 4, 2019, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/can-china-grow-its-own-ai-tech-base.

75 Xilinx provides chips called FPGAs, while Seagate and Western Digital provide AI surveillance-optimized storage solutions. For further details see Dahlia Peterson, “Foreign Technology and the Surveillance State”in China’s Quest for Foreign Technology: Beyond Espionage, eds. William C. Hannas and Didi Kirsten Tatlow (London: Routledge, September 2020).

76 “AI芯片厂商与传统安防制造企业紧密合作 拓展安防业务” [AI chip manufacturers work closely with traditional security manufacturing companies to expand security business], 中国安防行业网 [China Security Industry Network], December 28, 2017,

https://web.archive.org/web/20200630000620/http://news.21csp.com.cn/c34/201712/11365694.html.

77 For further examples see Dahlia Peterson, “Foreign Technology and the Surveillance State.”

78  “Congressional Letter Calls Out US Companies Supporting Dahua and Hikvision,” IPVM, March 11, 2019, https://ipvm.com/reports/letter-support; Liza Lin and Josh Chin, “U.S. Tech Companies Prop Up China’s Vast Surveillance Network,” The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-techcompanies-prop-up-chinas-vast-surveillance-network-11574786846.

79  “China Uyghur Analytic Projects Require Intel And NVIDIA, Intel Condemns, NVIDIA Silent,” IPVM, December 2, 2019, https://ipvm.com/reports/uyghur-intel-nvidia.

80  Charles Rollet, “China Government Spreads Uyghur Analytics Across China,” IPVM, November 25, 2019, https://ipvm.com/reports/ethnicity-analytics; Paul Mozur, “One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a Minority,” The New York Times, April 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/ technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html. Hikvision is a notable example of a company that actively marketed — then deleted — coverage of its Uyghur detection and analytics capabilities on its website. See Charles Rollet, “Hikvision Markets Uyghur Ethnicity Analytics, Now Covers Up,” IPVM, November 11, 2019, https://ipvm.com/reports/hikvision-uyghur.

81  Matt Schiavenza, “Why Aren’t More Countries Confronting China over Xinjiang?,” ChinaFile, January 14, 2020, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/why-arent-more-countries-confronting-china-overxinjiang. Qatar initially signed, then withdrew its support for the UNHCR letter deploring the Xinjiang situation.

82  “Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China,” Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, https://www.ipac.global;Benedict Rogers, “Parliamentarians From Around the World Unite to Discuss the China Challenge,” The Diplomat,June 6, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/parliamentarians-from-around-the-world-unite-to-discuss-thechina-challenge; “Launch of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence by 15 founding members,” French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, June 15, 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/digital-diplomacy/news/article/launch-of-the-global-partnership-on-artificial-intelligence-by-15-founding.

83  Anna Gross and Madhumita Murgia, “China Shows its Dominance in Surveillance Technology,” Financial Times, December 26, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/b34d8ff8-21b4-11ea-92da-f0c92e957a96.

84  California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, “The Proposition 65 List,” https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition-65/proposition-65-list; United States Environmental Protection Agency, “Toxics Release Inventory (TRI)Program,” https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program.

85 Danielle Cave, Fergus Ryan, and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, “Mapping more of China’s tech giants.”

86  The guidance says “Before a transaction, Exporters should consider what the Item is capable of, and how it could be used or misused by authorities. Exporters might consider integrating safety and ‘privacy by design’ features that enable them to track the Item’s deployment and alert them to misuse, strip certain capabilities from the Item,auto-delete data and provide a kill-switch.” See “Draft U.S. Government Guidance for the Export of Hardware,Software and Technology With Surveillance Capabilities and/or Parts/Know-how,” U.S. Department of State,October 29, 2019, https://www.eff.org/files/2019/10/29/draft-guidance-for-the-export-of-hardware-software-andtechnology-with-surveillance-capabilities.pdf.

87  The Wassenaar Arrangement, https://www.wassenaar.org/.

88  Foreign Advanced Technology Surveillance Accountability Act, H.R. 7307, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7307/text; “Curtis, Malinowski Introduce Bipartisan Foreign Advanced Technology Surveillance Accountability Act,” Congressman John Curtis, June 24, 2020, https://curtis.house.gov/press-releases/curtis-malinowski-introduce-bipartisan-foreign-advanced-technology-surveillance-accountability-act.

89 Danielle Cave, Fergus Ryan, and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, “Mapping more of China’s tech giants.”

90  James T. Areddy and Michelle Hackman, “China’s Muslim Uighurs Are Stuck in U.S. Immigration Limbo,”The Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2020,https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-muslim-uighurs-are-stuck-in-u-simmigration-limbo-11595937603.

91  Involuntary labor related to Xinjiang oppression is complex and pervasive, occurring well beyond factories located within or adjacent to internment camps. The U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 defines “forced labor” as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself voluntarily.” This could potentially include all Uyghurs and others channeled into state-run and public-private manufacturing arrangements in a context when refusal may result in internment or imprisonment. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1307 (1930), https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title19/chapter4&edition=prelim.

92  Jason Judd and Sarosh Kuruvilla, “Why apparel brands’ efforts to police their supply chains aren’t working,” The Conversation, April 30, 2020. https://theconversation.com/why-apparel-brands-efforts-to-police-their-supplychains-arent-working-136821.

93 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exclusive: Caterpillar sourced clothes from Xinjiang factory involved in coercive labor.”

94 Amy Lehr, “Addressing Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.”

95  Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-145 (2020) https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ145/PLAW-116publ145.pdf.

96  See “Meshrep,” Intangible Cultural Heritage, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,https://ich.unesco.org/en/USL/meshrep-00304 and “Uyghur Muqam of Xinjiang,” Intangible Cultural Heritage,United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/uyghur-muqamof-xinjiang-00109. For background on abuses of these and other Uyghur cultural heritage, see “UHRP Report:Extracting Cultural Resources: the Exploitation and Criminalization of Uyghur Cultural Heritage,” (Washington,DC: Uyghur Human Rights Project, June 12, 2018), https://uhrp.org/press-release/extracting-cultural-resourcesexploitation-and-criminalization-uyghur-cultural.

97  Minxin Pei, “China needs an exit strategy from Xinjiang,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 8, 2020,https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-needs-an-exit-strategy-from-Xinjiang2; Amy Lehr, “Addressing Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.”Ilham Tohti, “Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region” and other writing by Tohti and other Chinese social scientists have proposed models for Xinjiang development that would avoid the mistakes of both the Pairing Assistance Program and the Great Development of the West campaigns.